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Liberal Ideals and Political Feasibility: 
Guest-Worker Programs as Second-Best Policies 
H award F Chang' 
A liberalized guest-worker program appeared to be a priority 
on the political agenda while President George W. Bush weighed 
proposals to expand access to employment -based visas 1 until 
terrorist attacks placed these plans on hold. 2 Support from both 
labor unions and business interests may make liberalizing reforms 
politically feasible in the near future,3 as the Bush administration, 
with the support of Democrats in Congress, has recently resumed 
negotiations with Mexico on immigration policy. 4 This dramatic 
reversal of the overwhelmingly restrictionist politics of recent 
years is a welcome development, as considerations of not only 
national economic welfare but also social justice militate in favor 
of liberalizing reforms. 
In the case of skilled aliens, the United States can lift 
' Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Visiting Professor of 
Law, University of Michigan Law School. Ph.D., 1 992, MIT; J.D., 1 987,  Harvard; 
M.P.A., 1 985, Princeton; A.B. ,  1 982, Harvard. I would like to thank the Symposium 
participants at the University of North Carolina School of Law for their helpful  
comments. 
1 See Dan Eggen & Helen Dewar, Bush Weighing Plan for Mexican Guest 
Workers, WASH. PosT, July 25, 200 1 ,  at A3; Eric Schmitt, Bush Panel Backs Legalizing 
Status of Some Migrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 200 1 ,  at A I; Eric Schmitt, Bush Says Plan 
for Immigrants Could Expand, N. Y. TIMES, July 27, 200 1 ,  at A I; Eric Schmitt, U.S.­
Mexico Talks Produce Agreement on Immigration Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. I 0,  200 1 ,  at 
A4. 
2 See Alfredo Corchado, Immigration Talks Between U.S., Mexico on Hold, 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 1 9, 200 1 ,  at SA; Mike Doming, Mexico Border Issue on 
Hold, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 2 1 ,  200 1 ,  at 1 6; Greg Miller & Nick Anderson, Mood Swiftly 
Changes on Immigration, L.A. T IMES, Sept. 1 8, 2001, at A l 2; James Sterngold, Legal 
Residency Hopes of Millions Dashed, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 200 1 ,  at A33. 
3 See Thomas B. Edsall & Cheryl W. Thompson, Alliance Fonns on Immigrant 
Policies: Business, Church, Labor Groups Unite on Liberalization, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 
200 1 ,  at A I. 
4 See Mary Jordan & Kevin Sullivan, U.S. and Mexico to Resume Talks on 
Immigration Policy, WASH. POST, Nov. 1 5 , 200 1 ,  at A40; Ginger Thompson, Top 
Democrats Politick T hrough Rural Mexico, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 1 9, 200 1 ,  at A12. 
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restnctwns on the employment of aliens consistent with the 
national interest by liberalizing access to employment-based 
immigrant visas for skilled workers.5 Skilled workers tend to have 
higher incomes and pay more in taxes than they cost in terms of 
public benefits. The empirical evidence confirms that educated 
immigrants will on average have a net positive effect on natives, 
taking into account their effects on the public treasury. 6 
In the case of unskilled aliens, however, the optimal policy­
from the perspective of the interests of natives-departs 
significantly from the policy prescribed by liberal ideals. From 
the narrow perspective of the economic interests of natives, 
temporary worker visas may be an optimal response to fiscal 
concerns regarding alien access to public benefits.7 Through 
guest-worker programs, natives enjoy the benefits of unskilled 
alien workers in the labor market but do not bear the fiscal burden 
of providing the full set of public benefits that these workers 
would receive if they had ready access to permanent residence and 
ultimately citizenship. 8 Although immigrants can gain full access 
to public benefits upon naturalization, only aliens "admitted for 
permanent residence" may naturali ze as U. S. citizens. 9 Aliens 
admitted on nonimmigrant visas only, including temporary 
workers, are not admitted as permanent residents and thus are not 
eligible for most public entitlements and are not eligible to 
naturalize. Current U. S. laws generally exclude not only 
5 See Howard F. Chang, T he Economic Analysis of Immigration Law, in 
MIGRATION THEORY: TALKING ACROSS DISCIPLINES 205 , 22 1 -22 (Caroline B. Brettell & 
James F. Hollifield eds., 2000). 
6 The National Research Council, for example, found that the average immigrant 
with more than a high-school education pays enough in taxes to produce a net fiscal 
benefit. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, 
DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 334 (James P. Smith & Barry 
Edmonston eds . ,  1997) [hereinafter NRC]. In fact, once the NRC economists take the 
positive fiscal effect of the immigrant's descendants into account, they find that the 
average immigrant with a high-school education produces a net surplus of $5 1 ,000, and 
the average immigrant with more than a high-school education produces a net surplus of 
$ 1 98,000. /d. at 334 tbl.7.5 (reporting net present value of average fiscal impacts in 
1 996 dollars). 
7 See Chang, supra note 5, at 222. 
8 For a discussion of the gains that natives enjoy from immigration in the labor 
market, see NRC , supra note 6, at 1 35-53. 
9 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2000). 
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unauthorized immigrants but also nonimmigrants, including 
temporary workers, from a broad range of public benefits: With 
only narrow exceptions, these aliens are ineligible for "any Federal 
public benefit." 10 Thus, because guest-worker programs can give 
unskilled aliens access to our labor markets without necessarily 
providing full access to the benefits provided to citizens, these 
programs may allow the most liberal admissions policies possible 
for these aliens without imposing a fiscal burden on natives. 
From the perspective of the interests of aliens, or from the 
perspective of liberal principles of social justice, however, these 
guest-worker programs are only second-best policies. The ideal 
policy, from these perspectives, may be legal permanent residence 
and access to citizenship and to all public benefits. This policy 
would be costly for natives, however, as the empirical evidence 
suggests that unskilled alien workers are likely to have a net 
negative fiscal impact if granted ready access to permanent 
residence and ultimately citizenship. 11 Thus, the self-interest of 
natives is bound to impose constraints of political feasibility on the 
availability of immigrant visas. It may be politically infeasible to 
ask natives to set aside their collective self-interest in  formulating 
our immigration laws. 12 The U. S. government will likely continue 
to deem the promotion of the interests of natives the paramount 
objective of our immigration policies.1 3 Thus, as long as natives 
are limited in their willingness to bear these fiscal burdens, they 
are likely to restrict alien access to permanent residence, either 
through quantitative restrictions or through qualitative restrictions 
10 8 U.S.C. § 1 6 1 1  (a) (2000). 
11 Taking the positive fiscal effect of the immigrant's descendants into account, the 
National Research Council finds that the average immigrant with Jess than a high-school 
education imposes a net fiscal burden of $ 1 3,000. NRC, supra note 6, at 334 tbl .7 .5 
(reporting net present value of average fiscal impacts in 1 996 dollars). 
12 As Seidman observes, the limitations imposed by "bounded caring" are, "like it 
or not . . . facts that exist in the world" and "unlikely to change more than marginally in 
the near future," so that any "real-world immigration policy must . . .  take account of 
these facts and work around them." Louis Michael Seidman, Fear and Loathing at the 
Border, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 136, 140 (Warren F. Schwartz ed.,  1995). 
1 3 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 98-62, at 3 (1983) ("[T]he paramount obligation of any 
nation's government, indeed the very reason for its existence and the justification for its 
power, is to promote the national interest-the long-term welfare of the majority of its 
citizens and their descendants.").  
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that establish demanding criteria for immigrant visa eligibility.14 
Some observers have described guest-worker programs 
without access to permanent residence as "more politically 
viable." 15 Thus, the Bush administration has shifted its energies 
toward a program for temporary workers, which it regards as 
"more acceptable politically." 16 Recognizing the political 
controversy generated by proposals that would grant access to 
citizenship, Mexico has also emphasized an expanded guest­
worker program in its negotiations with the Bush administration 
and has been careful not to press the issue of citizenship. 17 
Under any politically feasible scenario, there will be many 
aliens who would like to gain access to the labor market but who 
are excluded by our immigration policies. Political constraints are 
likely to exclude many unskilled aliens from the U. S. labor market 
unless they are either willing to immigrate illegally or have access 
to guest-worker visas. Given these constraints on access to 
permanent residence, guest-worker programs may represent the 
only alternative to illegal immigration for aliens otherwise 
excluded from the U. S. labor market.18 Under these 
14 Cf. Ronald Brownstein, Residency at Core of Immigrant Debate, L.A. TIMES, 
July 29, 200 1 ,  at A I  (discussing the debate over criteria and legislation that would allow 
immigrants to achieve permanent resident status). 
15 Jonathan Peterson, Amnesty's the Road Bump in Debate on Immigration, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 9, 2001, at A l2. Conservative Republicans like Senator Phil Gramm 
adamantly oppose any access to permanent residence for guest workers. Gramm has said 
that any such program would have to pass "over my cold, dead political body." Michelle 
Mittelstadt, Senators Call for Giving Residency to Immigrants, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 
July 19 , 200 1 ,  at 1 A. In a recent Gallup poll, sixty-seven percent of respondents rejected 
easier access to U.S. citizenship for unauthorized immigrants, while only twenty-eight  
percent supported this proposal. Steve Sailer, Analysis: Why Bush Blundered on 
Immigrants, UPI, Sept. 1 0, 200 1 ,  available at LEXIS, News Library, UPI File. 
16 Jonathan Peterson, Immigration Emphasis on Guest Visas, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1 8, 
2001, at AI. 
17 B y  maintaining flexibility on this issue, Mexico seeks, as the Mexican foreign 
minister Jorge Castaneda puts it, "as many rights as possible, for as many Mexicans (in 
the United States) as possible, as soon as possible" within the constraints of political 
feasibility. Robert Collier, Momentum Crows to Legalize Migrants, S.F. CHRON., July 
16, 200 1 ,  at A I. As one Mexican negotiator explained, "we . . . have to be very 
realistic." Alfredo Corchado, Fox Pushes for a More Open Border, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, July 1 6, 200 1 ,  at 1 A. Castaneda has explained that access to citizenship "is not 
something of huge significance to us." Sergio Munoz, Jorge Castaneda: Mexico's Man 
Abroad, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1 2, 2001, at M3. 
18 See JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 303 
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circumstances, an expanded guest-worker program would 
represent an improvement not only for the aliens who thereby gain 
admission but also for natives. 
In this essay, I argue in favor of a liberalized guest-worker 
program as a reform that would promote the welfare of both 
natives and aliens, compared to the politically feasible alternatives. 
In Part I, I propose a series of reforms that expands access to the 
U. S. labor market for unskilled alien workers without imposing an 
economic burden on natives. In Part II, I argue that although 
guest-worker programs do not comply with liberal ideals, they 
nevertheless represent an improvement over the alternative of 
exclusion, whether from the standpoint of the guest worker or 
from the perspective of cosmopolitan liberalism. In Part III, I 
conclude that given political constraints that make more ideal 
policies infeasible, liberals concerned with the welfare of aliens 
should support liberalized guest-worker programs. 
I. Guest-Worker Programs and the Interests of Natives 
Current programs for u nskilled guest workers are subject to 
protectionist restrictions and are therefore little used.19 For 
example, both H-2A visas for agricultural workers and H-2B visas 
for other unskilled workers are subject to burdensome "labor 
certification" requirements. 2° Furthermore, H-2B visas are limited 
to 66,000 per year,21 and require workers to come "temporarily to 
the United States to perform . . .  temporary service or labor."22 
This "double requirement of 'temporariness'" requires the H-2B 
alien not only to enter temporarily, but also to fill a temporary 
( 1 989) ("Being a temporary worker may well be inferior, and may even seem 'unfair,' 
compared to full admission as a legal immigrant, but this simply is not a realistic 
alternative; to compare a temporary worker program unfavorably against a non-existent 
alternative is either thoughtless or dishonest."). 
1 9 See 8 U .S.C. § l i O I(a)(!S )(H)(ii) (2000). 
20 See id. § 1188(a) ( l )  (requiring the H-2A petitioner to show that "there are not 
sufficient workers who are able, willing, and qualified, and who will be available at the 
time and place needed" and that "the employment of the alien .. . will not adversely 
affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States"); 8 C.F.R. § 
214.2(h)(6)(iv) (200 I) (requiring a similar showing for the H-2B visa). 
21 See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)( l )(B) (2000). 
22 !d .§  I!Ol(a)(IS)(H)(ii)(b). 
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job. 23 The liberalization of these burdensome requirements coul d  
greatl y  increase use of these programs. 24 We should expand access 
to these programs by either liberalizing or eliminating l abor 
certification requirements, quotas, and restrictions on the duration 
of guest-worker employment or on their stays in the United States. 
We should also remove restrictions on the types of 
employment that these guest workers may take, so that aliens are 
free to seek any job in the United States, and all sectors of the U. S. 
economy can benefit from hiring them. Recent discussions of an 
expanded guest-worker program envisioned liberalization beyond 
the agricultural sector to include the service sector of the U. S. 
economy, 25 which woul d  represent at least a step in the right 
direction. Better yet would be a program without any restrictions 
on the employment open to guest workers. 
Many worthwhile reforms would be consistent with the 
economic interests of natives. The protection of the interests of 
natives does not require many of the restrictions currently imposed 
on guest workers. 2 6 There is no need, for example, to restrict the 
alien's freedom to move from one employer to another or from 
one sector of the economy to another. Like immigration 
restrictions in general, restrictions on mobility between jobs are 
economically inefficient as well as u nduly burdensome for the 
worker subject to the restriction. Freedom to l eave an employer 
and to take employment elsewhere would give workers greater 
power to assert their rights against employers and thus prevent 
abuses, without destroying the gains from trade that natives enjoy 
2 3 THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF ET AL. ,  IMMIGRATION AND CITrZENSHIP: PROCESS AND 
POLICY 395 (4th ed. 1998). 
2 4  Admissions under H-2B visas have remained below ont'-third of the quota limit 
in recent years, and admissions under H-2A visas have been similar. See id. at 393 ,  395 
(noting that the demand for H-2B visas "would be much higher but for the double 
'temporariness' requirement"); Alan 0. Sykes, T he Welfare Economics of Immigration 
Law, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION, supra note 1 2, at 1 58 ,  1 89 (noting that "because of the 
transaction costs of obtaining a visa coupled with the limited certifications for labor 
shortages in the agricultural sector," employers often find that H-2A visas "are not worth 
the effort to procure"). 
2 5  See Diane Lindquist, Guest-Worker Plan Offers Jobs Beyond Fanns, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB . ,  Aug. 1 0, 200 1 ,  at A26. 
2 6 Democrats in Congress have stressed that guest workers should  enjoy the same 
rights in the workplace as citizens. See Jonathan Peterson, Democrats Up Ante to 
Refonn Immigration, L.A. TIMES. Aug. 3 ,  200 I, at A 1 .  
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from employing alien workers. Thus, both Mexico and Democrats 
in Congress have urged that a reformed guest-worker policy 
inc! ude the freedom to change employers, 27 and a proposal 
emerging from ongoing negotiations between the United States 
and Mexico could include at least this refom1. 28  We can also 
fortify the guest worker's incentives to complain about abuses 
with protections against employer retaliation for whistle-blowers 
or even bounties or other rewards for those who make meritorious 
claims that their employers are violating the rights of employees. 29 
At the same time, we must reduce or eliminate the protectionist 
barriers that we currently impose on employer sponsorship, such 
as labor certification. These liberalizing reforms are especial ly 
essential if we make the employee's visa more portable. 
Employers will be reluctant to invest much time or money in 
sponsoring a worker's visa if the worker is then free to leave to 
work for a competing employer who can thereby take a free ride 
on the sponsoring employer's investment in the visa. 
Although the Bush administration has focused on negotiations 
with Mexico, the United States should avoid any discrimination 
among aliens based on national origin in an expanded guest­
worker program. Just as all sectors of the U.S. economy would 
benefit from a liberalized program, the economy would also gain 
by liberalizing access to its labor markets for all aliens regardless 
of nationality. We can enjoy the same economic benefits from 
workers from all nations, and to discriminate among workers 
based on national origin needlessly introduces costly distortions in 
the labor market. It is appropriate that Democrats in Congress 
have urged broad liberalization for aliens of all nationalities30 and 
27 See Cheryl W. Thompson, Democrats to Offer Plan to Reform Immigration, 
WASH. PosT, Aug. 2, 200 l, at A2; Corchado, supra note 1 7 ,  at l A. 
28 See Marcus Stern, New Immigration Plan Raises New Issues: U.S.-Mexican 
Strategy Goes Beyond Amnesty, Guest- Worker Program, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 
12, 200 1,  at A 1 .  
29 The AFL-CIO has urged whistle-blower protections and amnesty for 
unauthorized immigrants who complain about substandard working conditions or other 
violations. See Nancy Cleeland, AFL-C!O Calls for Amnesty for Illegal U.S. Workers, 
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1 7, 2000, at A I; Frank Swoboda, Unions Reverse on Illegal Aliens, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2000, at Al. 
30 See Peterson, supra note 26, at A I; Thompson, supra note 27, at A2. 
i 
� 
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that the Bush administration has seemed open to this suggestion. 31 
We might also allow unskilled guest workers to adjust their 
status to permanent residence without imposing a net burden on 
natives if appropriate conditions are met. 3 2 In fact, as the Bush 
administration considers proposals to liberalize our immigration 
policies, it has discussed an expanded guest-worker program that 
would eventually allow guest workers to adjust their status to 
permanent residence and ultimately naturalize as citizens. Mexico 
has urged the United States to allow guest workers to remain 
permanently, and a proposal including some sort of access to 
permanent residence could eventually emerge from the 
negotiations between the two countries. 33 The conditions for 
adjustment of status might include, for example, a sufficiently 
lengthy period of residence and employment as a guest worker 
without a criminal record, as well as payment of a sufficient 
amount in taxes over this period. 3 4 Thus, admission as a guest 
worker need not entail permanent status as an alien. Empirical 
evidence indicates that the United States could allow even an 
unskilled immigrant to naturalize without generating a net fiscal 
burden if a sufficient period of alienage with only limited access to 
public benefits has passed. 3 5  
In reality, access to citizenship is a matter of degree. Aliens 
might be given the opportunity to naturalize after a short period of 
residence or only after a long period. We might demand a long 
work history and a large amount of taxes paid or impose less 
stringent requirements. A liberalized guest-worker program could 
choose any point along this continuum to satisfy critics concerned 
31 See Edwin Chen & Jonathan Peterson, Bush Hints at Broader Amnesty, L.A.  
TIMES, July 27,  2001, at  A I. 
3 2 See Chang, supra note 5, at 223. 
3 3  See Stern, supra note 28, at A I. 
3 4 See Laurie Goering, Bush Considering Green Card "Points, " CHI. TRIB., Aug. 
22, 200 1 , at 1; Eric Schmitt, No Agreement Yet with Mexico on Immigration Plan, N .Y. 
TIMES, Sept. I, 200 1 ,  at Al. 
3 5  The National Research Council found that once we take the positive fiscal effect 
of the immigrant's descendants into account, an immigrant with less than a high-school 
education imposes a net fiscal cost of only $ 1 3,000 in net present value in 1 996 dollars; 
see NRC, supra note 6, at 334; and that if the 1 996 welfare legislation excl udes 
immigrants from seven specified means-tested benefits for only their first five years in 
the United States, then the total fiscal impact of the average immigrant would improve 
by $8,000; see id. at 339. 
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about the fiscal impact of unskilled immigrants or the political 
impact of their naturalization and participation in the electorate. 3 6  
In any event, a guest-worker program would not produce a 
hereditary class of alien residents in the United States, because the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution gives U. S. 
citizenship to anyone born in the United States, including the 
children of nonimmigrants. 37 Thus, guest-worker programs in the 
United States cannot create the type of caste society that they 
might in countries that do not provide this birthright citizenship. 
Furthermore, citizenship for the children of immigrants has proven 
to be consistent with the national economic interest, as the 
available evidence indicates that the descendants of even unskilled 
immigrants have a positive fiscal impact. 38 
To help deflect criticism that we are rewarding unauthorized 
immigrants for violating our immigration laws, 39 we could refuse 
to count unauthorized work or residence as a factor in granting an 
alien status as either a guest worker or a permanent resident. We 
could continue to require employer sponsorship, which would not 
only ensure that the guest worker is gainfully employed (and thus 
likely to provide a net economic benefit to natives), but also tend 
as a practical matter to be a requirement most easily met by those 
aliens who are already employed in the United States as 
unauthorized immigrants. Thus, a guest-worker program could 
function in effect as a means for unauthorized immigrants to 
legalize their status without allowing them to derive any formal 
36 See Sailer, supra note 15 (suggesting that the Republican Party resists 
legalization of unauthorized immigrants because it fears adding Hispanic voters to the 
electorate). 
3 7  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § l (" All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside."). 
38 See NRC, supra note 6, at 329 ("[T]he present value of the descendants of a 
cun·ent immigrant . . .  is always positive, regardless of the immigrant's age at arrival and 
education level."). 
39 See Brownstein, supra note 14, at A26 ("[M]any conservatives say that creating 
a broad path toward permanent residency would reward illegal immigrants for breaking 
the law. "); Thomas B. Edsall, Amnesty Proposal Is Huge Gamble for Bush, WASH. POST, 
July 17, 2001, at A2 (quoting Sen. Phil Gramm as calling amnesty for unauthorized 
immigrants "'very bad policy' that 'rewards lawlessness"'); Peterson, supra note 15,  at 
A 12 (quoting Rep. Tom Tancrcdo as criticizing amnesty for unauthorized immigrants as 
"rewarding someone for breaking the law"). 
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benefit from their unauthorized residence or employment. Unlike 
an amnesty program, which wo�1ld only legalize the stock of 
unauthorized immigrants already here, a guest-worker program 
could also legalize some of the t1ow of unautho1ized immigrants 
into the United States, thereby providing a more permanent 
sol ution to the problem of illegal immigration. These workers 
would gain from having a legal alternative to illegal entry and life 
as an unauthorized immigrant, which leaves them vulnerable to 
deportation by the government and to abuse by employers. 
To help det1ect criticism that any legalization of unauthorized 
immigrants is unfair to those waiting patiently for visas to 
immigrate legally,40 a guest-worker program coul d  give priority to 
qualified applicants who have also applied for immigration visas 
subject to backlogs. Such a program would have the advantage of 
allowing those who are already entitled to permanent residence to 
gain admission to the United States and its labor market sooner. 
This reform would benefit not only the alien granted quicker 
admission but also natives, who derive greater fiscal benefits from 
the alien's earlier admission. The age of an immigrant at the time 
of entry proves to be an important determinant of the total fiscal 
impact of that immigrant. In general, the younger the immigrant 
at the time of entry, the more working years the immigrant can 
spend in the United States, the more tax revenues the immigrant 
will contribute to public coffers prior to retirement, and the more 
positive the immigrant's overall fiscal impact.41 Thus, a guest­
worker program that allows immigrants waiting in backlogs to 
enter the United States sooner also allows natives to enjoy the 
economic benefits of more of each immigrant worker 's productive 
years and improves the total fiscal impact of each of those 
immigrants. 
II. Liberal Ideals, the Interests of Aliens, and the Second-Best 
Once we lift restrictions on the duration of a guest worker's 
residence and employment in the United States, however, the 
program raises the prospect of de facto permanent residents with 
40 See Mittelstadt, supra note 1 5, at l A  (quoting Rep. Tom Tancredo as calling 
amnesty for unauthorized immigrants "a kick in the teeth to the thousands of  individuals 
across the world who are legally attempting to enter the United States"). 
41 See NRC, supra note 6, at 328 fig.7 .10. 
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only restricted access to citizenship.42 Liberal objections to this 
prospect account for at least some of the political resistance to 
expansion of these guest-worker programs. James Woodward 
objects that "[t]he creation of a class of permanent residents who 
are restricted from becoming citizens (if they should wish to do 
so) or any similar system of differential status among a state's 
permanent inhabitants is fundamentally incompatible with liberal 
egalitarian ideals."43 
As Joseph Carens and others have argued, however, the 
exclusion of aliens is also incompatible with these ideals. 
Consider the liberal theory of justice developed by John Rawls, 
who asks what principles people would choose behind a "veil of 
ignorance."44 In this "original position," people know nothing 
about their own personal circumstances or traits and thus "do not 
know how the various al ternatives will affect their own particular 
case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis 
of general considerations."45 This condition ensures that "the 
parties are fairly situated and treated equally as moral persons."46 
Using Rawls's theory, Carens addresses the issue of immigration 
restrictions as a question of social justice.47 In seeking a 
justification for the exclusion of aliens, "we don't want to be 
biased by self-interested or partisan considerations" and instead 
"can take it as a basic presupposition that we should treat all 
human beings, not just members of our own society, as free and 
equal moral persons."48 Carens identifies this premise as a basic 
42 See Munoz, supra note 17, at M3. 
4 3  James Woodward, Commentary: Liberalism and Migration, in FREE MOVEMENT: 
ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION OF PEOPLE AND OF MONEY 59, 82 
(Brian Barry & Robert E. Goodin eds., 1992) [hereinafter FREE MOVEMENT]. The 
communitarian Michael Walzer adopts a similar position. See MICHAEL WALZER, 
SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 56-61 (1983) (arguing that 
guest-worker programs are inconsistent with political justice in a democratic state). 
44 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 ( 1971 ). 
4 5  !d. at 136-37; see id. at 14 1 ("If a knowledge of particulars is allowed, then the 
outcome is biased by arbitrary contingencies."). 
46 !d. at 141. 
47 See Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV. 
PoL. 251, 255 (1987). 
48 !d. at 256. 
476 N.C. J. lNT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 27 
feature of all liberal political theories;1Y concluding that we should 
"take a global ,  not national, view of the original position."50 
If we begin with equal concern for al l persons, then 
immigration barTiers are morally suspect and demand justification. 
All our imrnigration restrictions discriminate against individuals 
based on their alienage, which in tum derives from immutable 
characteristics, such as the geographic location of their birth (that 
is, national origin) and other circumstances of birth such as 
parentage.5 1  National origin appears to be a trait that Rawls would 
deem "arbitrary from a moral point of view."52 Carens concludes 
that we cannot justify restrictions "on the grounds that those born 
in a given territory or born of parents who were citizens were more 
entitled to the benefits of citizenship than those born elsewhere or 
of alien parents."5 3 Nor can we justify restrictions "on the grounds 
that immigration would reduce the economic well-being of current 
citizens. "54 Similarly, in a utilitarian calculation of global welfare, 
"current citizens would enjoy no privileged position."5 5  Carens 
and others conclude from these cosmopolitan liberal premises that 
"we have an obligation to open our borders much more fully than 
we do now."56 
49 See id. at 265 (claiming that "our social institutions and public policies must 
respect all human beings as moral persons" which "entails recognition . . .  of the freedom 
and equality of every human being"); id. at  269 ("No moral argument will seem 
acceptable . . .  if it directly challenges the assumption of the equal moral worth of all 
individuals. "). 
50 !d. at 256. 
5 1  See U.S.  CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born . . .  in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . . . .  "); 8 U.S .  C. § 
1 40 I ( 1 994) (setting forth categories of "citizens of the United States at birth"). 
52 RAWLS, supra note 44, at 72. 
5 3 Carens, supra note 47, at 26 1 .  
54 !d. at 262. 
55 !d. at 263 ("[T]he utilitarian commitment to moral equality is retlected in the 
assumption that everyone is to count for one and no one for more than one when utility is 
calculated. "). 
56 !d. at 270. Carens condemns immigration restrictions: "Like feudal baniers to 
mobility, they protect unjust privilege. " !d. Similarly, Bruce Ackerman concludes that 
immigration baniers are inconsistent with liberal principles: "I cannot justify my power 
to exclude you without destroying my own claim to membership in an ideal liberal 
state. " BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 93 ( 1 980); see 
Roger Nett, The Civil Right We Are Not Ready For: The Right of Free Movement of 
People on the Face of the Earth, 8 1  ETHICS 212, 224 ( 197 I) ("May we expect the lesson 
-
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Political realities, however, may prevent the adoption of the 
immigration policies implied by these liberal ideals. If political 
realities require us to choose between two alternatives, the 
exclusion of an alien and the alien's admission as a guest worker, 
both of which deviate from liberal egalitarian ideals, then how can 
Woodward justify the choice that inflicts the greater harm on the 
alien as well as on natives?57 Ironically, Woodward himself notes 
that if we act against a "background of non-ideal institutions and 
behaviour" in a world "in which large numbers of people and 
institutions fail to do what justice requires," we may "acquire 
obligations which are different from those [we] would acquire 
under more perfectly just institutional arrangements."58 As 
Woodward states the theory of the second-best: 
It is not in general a defensible moral principle that if it is 
obligatory (or even a good thing) to do P under ideal, 
utopian circumstances, then it is also obligatory (or even a 
good thing) to do P under the actual circumstances, no 
matter how far they may differ from the ideal. 59 
Robert Goodin notes that "[t]here is much to be said for the 
realist argument" that insists upon "the importance of not making 
a fetish of moral ideals," because "doing the best you can in an 
imperfect world may well require you to compromise any (indeed, 
all) of your moral ideals" and a "[f]ailure to take due account of 
the probable reactions of others can ... have consequences that 
are truly catastrophic. "60 
Although Woodward advances realist claims in defense of 
immigration restrictions, they could more plausibly justify 
which the Negro has taught his fellow Americans about denial of fair opportunities to be 
repeated on a broader scale, with the underprivileged of the earth demanding 
'desegregation' of nation states?''). 
57 Carens agrees that to admit guest workers without "giving them the opportunity 
to become citizens" is "incompatible with our liberal democratic principles," but adds 
that "so is a restrictive policy on immigration." Carens, supra note 47, at 268. 
58 Woodward, supra note 43, at 78 .  
5 9  !d. at  77;  see Joseph H. Carens, Migration and Morality: A Liberal Egalitarian 
Perspective, in FREE MOVEMENT, supra note 43, at 25, 45 ("Ideals do not always 
translate directly into prescriptions for practice because of the second-best problems 
familiar from economic theory which have their analogue in moral theory.") .  
6 0  Robert E .  Goodin, Commentary: The Political Realism o f  Free Movement, in 
FREE MOVEMENT, supra note 43 , at 248, 255. 
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restrictions on alien access to public benefits and to citizenship. 
Indeed, Woodward himself notes that "it is far from obvious that it 
would be wrong . . .  to limit eligibility for social welfare 
programmes to citizens or long-term residents, if failure to do so 
would jeopardize the continued existence of such programmes."61 
We might say the same about restrictions on alien access to public 
benefits and citizenship if these restrictions are necessary to make 
politically feasible the alien's access to our labor market and the 
alien's admission in the first place. 
After all, exclusion offers no obvious advantages over a guest­
worker program, whether from the standpoint of political justice or 
from the perspective of the interests of the alien worker.62 
Exclusion discriminates against the alien just as surely as guest­
worker status does. Like admission under a guest-worker policy, 
exclusion is an exercise of the state's authority over the alien, and 
neither policy offers the alien any role in the formulation of that 
policy through participation in the U.S. political system. If we 
must choose between these two forms of discrimination, then we 
should opt for the guest-worker program, because complete 
exclusion from the United States is the more sweeping form of 
discrimination and inflicts the greater harm on the alien. The 
guest-worker program at least offers the alien a choice, and by 
choosing to come as a guest worker, the alien reveals a preference 
for guest-worker status over the alternative of exclusion.63 
These second-best arguments require us to rank two non-ideal 
61 Woodward, supra note 43, at 79. 
62 See Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic 
Welfare and the Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1192-94 (1997) 
(arguing that a guest-worker program is better than a policy of exclusion). 
63 See SIMON, supra note 1 8, at 303 ("Participating in the program must be better 
for at least some persons than not participating, or else there would be no participants in 
the program. ") . There seems little reason to second-guess the alien regarding the 
decision to become a guest-worker. See id. at 310 (arguing that if we wish to show 
respect for the alien's "human dignity," then "giving people the choice of whether they 
do or do not wish to serve as guestworkers seems to be more dignified than deciding for 
them that serving as guestworkers would not be good for them"). While paternalistic 
regulations may be appropriate when we have evidence that individuals make irrational 
choices, it is difficult to declare the decision to become a guest-worker irrational, given 
the altematives that these aliens face. See Seidman, supra note 12, at 143 ("Why should 
anyone believe that a guest worker is 'exploited' when he receives higher wages and 
more protection in the program than he would receive if he remained in his home 
country?"). 
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altematives, both of which fall short of our liberal ideals.64 In this 
regard, teleological moral theories have an advantage over 
deontological theories. Under a teleological theory, "those 
institutions and acts are right which of the available alternatives 
produce the most good."65 Once we specify the good, then a 
teleological theory can provide a complete ranking of all 
alternatives, including non-ideal altematives.66 Deontological 
theories, which do not maximize a good specified in advance,67 
may not readily provide a ranking of non-ideal alternatives.68 
We might, for example, specify the good as an appropriate 
measure of social welfare, one based on the satisfaction of 
preferences but excluding those preferences that violate liberal 
principles of equality. Ronald Dworkin, for example, has 
proposed such a teleological theory.69 If we apply this type of 
consequentialism and adopt a cosmopolitan perspective, then a 
guest-worker program represents the lesser of two evils when 
compared with the alternative of exclusion. To exclude aliens 
from our labor markets not only decreases global wealth but also 
worsens its distribution, whereas a guest-worker program would 
improve social welfare on both counts.70 
From this cosmopolitan perspective, liberal opposition to 
guest-worker policies is misguided, because the alternative of 
exclusion raises even worse moral problems. Discriminating 
64 See SIMON, supra note 1 8 , at 3 1 0  ("Compared to a beautiful world of no borders 
and perfect freedom to live with full  rights wherever one likes, having both citizens and 
non-citizens within a country may seem undesirable. But compared to a world in which 
every country controls who may enter . . .  the comparison may seem quite different."). 
65 RAWLS, supra note 44, at 24. 
66 For definitions of a "complete" ordering, see ROBIN BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE, 
WELFARE ECONOMICS 34 ( 1 984) and JOHN VON NEUMANN & 0SK.AR MORGENSTERN, 
THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 26 (3d ed. 1 953 ). 
67 See RAWLS, supra note 44, at 30. 
68 See id. at 303 (suggesting that "we may be able to find no satisfactory answer at 
all" in "instances of nonideal theory"). 
69 See RONALD DWORKJN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 234-38 ( 1 977) .  I have 
outlined a similar theory, which I call "liberal consequentialism." Howard F. Chang, A 
Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Uti/it)', and the Pareto Principle, 1 1 0  YALE 
L.J. l 73 ,  1 95-96 (2000). 
70 See Chang, supra note 5, at 207-08; Bob Hamilton & John Whalley, Efficiency 
and Distributional Implications of Global Restrictions on Labour Mobility, 1 4  J. DEV. 
ECON. 6 1 ,  70-74 ( 1 984). 
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against aliens in the allocation of employment oppor1unities in the 
United States may benefit some U. S. workers, but only at the 
expense of employers who must bear higher labor costs, the 
consumers who must pay higher prices for goods and services, and 
the al ien workers who are confined to labor markets where they 
earn lower wages than those prevailing in the U. S. labor market 
and are thus even worse off than the beneficiaries of the policy of 
exclusion. Thus, the employment discrimination against aliens 
implied by a policy of exclusion is difficult to justify from a 
cosmopolitan perspective because its primary victims are poorer 
than the workers who are privileged by this discriminatory regime. 
If guest-worker programs make us uneasy, then exclusion should 
only make us more so, because it keeps alien workers in a state of 
poverty that they would prefer to escape as guest workers. In this 
sense, the liberal who invokes ideal principles to condemn guest­
worker programs while favoring the alternative of exclusion is 
vulnerable to the charge of "superstitious 'rule worship, "'  that is, 
"the charge of heartlessness, in his apparently preferrin g  abstract 
conformity to a rule to the prevention of avoidable human 
suffering."7 1 
III. Conclusion 
From a welfare perspective, It IS harmful public policy to 
exclude the alien worker from not only U. S. citizenship but also 
our labor market, given that admission as a guest worker would 
make both the alien worker and U. S. natives better off. The 
employment discrimination implied by a policy of exclusion is 
difficult to justify whether we adopt the cosmopolitan perspective 
or instead embrace less egalitarian liberal ideals and favor the 
interests of natives over those of aliens. Considerations of both 
global economic welfare and national economic welfare militate in 
favor of liberalized alien access to our labor markets. While the 
employment discrimination against aliens implied by our 
immigration restrictions remains difficult to j ustify, some 
discrimination against unskilled aliens in the distribution of public 
benefits and in access to citizenship may serve the i nterests of 
natives. 
7 1 J.J .C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in J.J.C. SMART & 
BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTlUTARIANISM :  FOR AND AGAINST 3, 6 ( 1 973) .  
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The cosmopolitan liberal would prefer that aliens have access 
to both our labor market and ready access to public benefits and 
citizenship. As a matter of political reality, however, natives are 
unlikely to admit aliens under those generous conditions in the 
numbers that cosmopolitan ideals would require, given the fiscal 
burden that those liberal policies would entail. Given this 
constraint of political feasibility, cosmopolitan liberals face a 
trade-off: significantly liberalized access to our labor markets for 
unskilled alien workers will likely require some restrictions in 
access to public benefits and citizenship to have a realistic chance 
of enactment. From a consequentialist perspective that extends 
equal concern to aliens and natives, guest-worker programs are 
less unjust than the status quo alternative of exclusion . Reforms 
that reduce employment discrimination against aliens should prove 
feasible, even while eliminating all discrimination against aliens 
remains an unrealistic ideal. Therefore, cosmopolitan liberals 
should support liberalizing reforms that include guest-worker 
programs, even while seeking the broadest rights possible for 
aliens within the constraints of political feasibility. While it would 
be a mistake to pretend that this compromise is ideal from a liberal 
egalitarian perspective, it would also be a mistake to sacrifice 
worthwhile reforms because they fall short of the ideal. 
